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Study Number 6039


USER GUIDE
ACTIVITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Non-Technical Summary

A 1000 word (maximum) summary of the main research results, in non-technical language, should be provided below. The summary might be used by ESRC to publicise the research. It should cover the aims and objectives of the project, main research results and significant academic achievements, dissemination activities and potential or actual impacts on policy and practice.

Objectives

1. Understand internal security needs of Rwanda/Liberia: perceptions of the public, policing agencies, state.
2. Explore internal security needs re international crime/terrorism: perceptions of the security agencies, government and donors.
3. Evaluate policing provision: availability and effectiveness of state and non-state policing in Rwanda/Liberia.
4. Investigate government capacity to provide state policing.
5. Establish policy options for internal security.

All but Objective 2 (where data was unobtainable or only anecdotal) were met, as the published outputs confirm.

Results

1. The transformation of the ‘multi-choice policing’ analytical framework into a strategy for access to justice and security sector reform policy. In collaboration with a security consultant, a ‘multi-layered approach’ was articulated for the support of post-conflict policing. For the end user, policing is an issue of choice/diversity (hence ‘multi-choice’); for development strategy, it is an issue of supporting multiple layers of policing providers (state; commercial; community-based; informal). Current SSR is state-centric. It makes two errors: that the post-conflict state is capable of delivering justice/security; that it is the main actor in justice/security. Multi-layered SSR addresses who is actually providing justice/security. It is based on the service quality received by the end user, regardless of who delivers that service.

2. The importance of linkages between non-state and state policing became apparent in Rwanda. The government admits its inability to provide a police service to meet all needs. theirs is a hybrid approach; combining professional police with the informal social control mechanisms of local justice. The latter is a dense network of local voluntary, safety/justice provision. It undertakes the everyday needs, from patrols to local courts. Though officially non-state, it has strong links with the state and has its support. The model has provided an effective, popular and universally accessible policing that is not resource intensive.
3. The Liberian government ignores linkages and is pursuing a state monopoly in policing. Though government capacity can be a severe constraint, faulty government policies exacerbate the problem. It is a mystery to see Liberia relying for all policing on its own a small state police force. Rwanda uses volunteers for everyday policing; yet Liberia has a SSR that ignores chiefs (who do almost all the rural policing/justice); and commercial security (that defends the important economic assets).

4. The serious policy errors being made by international policing experts as they reform the police in Liberia. UN-led policing reform has been too narrow in focus, ignoring commercial and customary structures. There is no consideration of how rural areas will be policed, by 3,500 urban-based police. Further, the vetting process of internal security agencies passed only 33%. It not only (inadequately) sought to remove those who had abused their office or were political appointees, but also those over 55 or with more than 25 years service. Thus the most experienced were removed when most needed and before new officers could gain the experience necessary to replace them. Again, the consultation with police and public was inadequate.

5. In Liberia ‘community policing’ has been introduced without the support of the police themselves to encourage and sustain it. The new initiatives already look threatened because of the minimal role given to the public.

6. Both countries show evidence of the politicisation of their policing agencies. In Rwanda the police still act as regime police. They detain opposition politicians, journalists and local election candidates. In Liberia senior security positions continue to be Presidential appointments. Such policies may provide regimes support and loyalty, but do not address one of the causes of the civil wars: governments and police that are partial.

7. The importance of political will in determining the quality of state policing. The Liberian administration affirms its anti-corruption credentials whilst tolerating corruption within the policing agencies. What makes the Rwandan police relatively free of corruption is political will - presidential determination that no such behaviour will tarnish the nation’s image and that discipline will be enforced. Liberia awaits an anti-corruption policy that is driven from the top.

**Outputs**

**Publications on post-conflict policing drawing on Rwandan and Liberian studies:**


**Publications on Rwandan Policing:**

RES-000-23-1102 - Multi-choice policing resources for post conflict situations: Rwanda and Liberia

Public order and policing are priorities for governments seeking to reconstruct their societies and economies after conflicts. Yet, in Africa, state police forces are small, urban and may have contributed to the conflicts. Aid donors have sought to establish Western models of policing but have failed because of the high resource demands. In addition, weak states face new problems of globalised criminals and terrorists establishing bases in their territories. This research, conducted through case studies of Liberia and Rwanda, showed how alternative policing providers can supplement the work of overstretched state police forces. State-centred approaches to policing, it suggests, are based on two fallacies: that the post-conflict state is capable of delivering justice and security, and that it is the main actor in those fields.

Key findings

- The Rwandan government acknowledged that it was unable on its own to provide a police service to meet all public needs. It sought to combine a professional and disciplined police force with the informal social control mechanisms of popular justice which undertook everyday activities from patrols to local courts. Although not part of the local administration, the informal providers had strong links with it.

- The Liberian government, by contrast, was pursuing a model of the state providing all internal security in spite of its obvious inability to do so. When Western states were themselves struggling to sustain state primacy in policing and criminal justice, it was strange to see one of the world’s poorest countries imitating the Western model.

- Post-conflict and fragile states are incapable of delivering policing single-handed. Rwanda admitted that this was the case, and actively looked to volunteers in local communities to shoulder much of the burden of everyday policing. Liberia, on the other hand, had developed a policy for security sector reform which made no mention of the chiefs who in reality handle most policing and justice in the countryside, or the commercial security interests that defend the country’s most important economic assets.

- International policing experts have made serious policy errors in United Nations-led efforts to reform policing in Liberia. Policing reform has been too narrow in its focus, ignoring commercial and customary structures. There appeared to be no serious consideration of how rural areas were to be policed. Consultation with the public and police on security reform had been hasty and narrow. In addition, the removal of older, long-serving officers had led to the loss of the most experienced ones when they were most needed.

- Both countries showed evidence of the persistence of the politicisation of their policing agencies. The Rwanda Police, for all their positive qualities, still acted as regime police and suppressed opposition to the government. Even
though the Liberian administration had a reputation for integrity, senior police management positions continued to be political appointments of the president.

- Political will is important in determining the quality of state policing. Although the Liberian administration had made much of its anti-corruption credentials, corruption was tolerated in the policing agencies. Determination by the Rwandan president that the country’s image should not be tarnished kept the police there relatively free from corruption.

**About the Study**

The research was conducted by Prof Bruce Baker of Coventry University. It involved interviews, focus groups, workshops, examination of government records and observation.

**Keywords**

Policing, Rwanda, Liberia, post-conflict
Multi-choice policing resources for post-conflict situations: Rwanda and Liberia

1. Research Background

Unless post-conflict governments enforce state laws/constitutions, maintain order and protect their citizens from crime, it is very difficult to reconstruct societies and economies. Hence freedom from insecurity, public order and policing are priorities in post-conflict reconstruction. Yet though increasing attention has been paid to reforming, training and equipping the state police, they are not sufficient for security reconstruction. This is because in Africa the state police are small and urban-based and their past abuses may even have contributed to the conflict. For 50 years efforts to establish Western models of policing have failed due to their high resource assumptions in terms of recruitment, training and equipment. To transform the state police into a public service may be beyond the capability of the donor community in the short term and beyond the state to sustain in the long term. Then there are the new problems of globalised crime/terrorism which are establishing bases in weak states.

Given these increasing demands on overstretched state police forces, the availability of alternative policing providers that could supplement their work in an effective and inexpensive manner needs to be considered. Audits of policing agencies in post-conflict states show a pattern of fragmented and overlapping policing covering a wide spectrum: the formal/informal, commercial/community, legal/illegal, state/non-state agencies. They offer localised protection of different levels of legality, effectiveness, availability, methods and services. What has not been clear is their extent; the nature of their service provision; whether the relationships between these policing agencies and the state police is collaborative or conflictual; and the degree to which they would make suitable partners along with the state police within justice and safety delivery nationwide.

Potentially there would appear to be considerable advantages for governments to acknowledge the reality of diverse policing and the opportunity for using it to extend order and security. Whatever the details, the principle of a national strategy of law and order that both meets perceived public needs and also integrates, regulates, mobilises, and empowers all those willing to preserve law and order in an acceptable manner is a fruitful place to start in improving the quality of national policing. But first it has to be established exactly what these alternative policing agencies could offer in post-conflict situations. What is their availability and quality of service provision, particularly from the perspective of the citizen? Why do people use these alternatives as opposed to the state police; how do they evaluate them; do either state or non-state policing offer them the services they want?

The case studies of Liberia and Rwanda were chosen since in both, international actors have sought to reshape the existing state police forces, yet they contrast in the length of their post-conflict policing experience (1 and 10 years). Published research on internal security for both countries had been minimal and centred on the state police.

2. Objectives

1. To understand the internal security needs of Rwanda and Liberia: perceptions of the public, policing agencies and state as regards the internal threats to order and security. In particular, what were the perceived threats to individuals, families and government? How had this changed since
the end of open conflict? Were there distinctive gender, urban/rural, regional or generational patterns to how order and crime was defined? Was there evidence of a post-conflict crime wave?

To establish answers to these questions a large number of authorisers, providers and users of policing in the two countries were interviewed individually or in groups. For a summary of the persons interviewed, see the ‘Methods’ section below. The published output confirms that this first objective has been met.

2. To explore the internal security needs: perceptions of the security agencies, government, diplomats and donors as regards the establishment of organised crime and terrorism and its impact outside of the country. In particular, were international criminal/terrorist groups a threat? What were the activities they were engaged in? Were they successfully being monitored and brought to justice?

Interviews were held with state security agencies, government, diplomats and donors, but there was a lack of detailed data and many of the responses were either anecdotal or somewhat evasive (presumably for security reasons). After making little success in Rwanda it was decided to drop this objective in the case of Liberia. It was apparent that this was a research subject that would be better handled separately and with specific prior warning to the national governments concerned.

3. To evaluate policing provision: the availability and effectiveness of state and non-state policing in Rwanda and Liberia. In particular, how available, effective, accountable, expensive and equitable were they? Did they meet the needs of the post-conflict situation? What was the effect of the conflict on these policing groups? Had they incorporated ex-combatants into their ranks and with what effect? How dependent were they on international/external assistance? To what extent had reform programmes and initiatives affected performance? To what degree did policing agencies co-operate? Were the policing patterns in the two countries similar or different and why?

To establish answers to these questions a large number of authorisers, providers and users of policing in the two countries were interviewed individually or in groups. For a summary of the persons interviewed, see the ‘Methods’ section below. The published output confirms that this objective has been met.

4. To investigate government capacity: capacity to provide effective state civilian policing nationwide. In particular, what provision had been made for infrastructure and equipment renewal, the retraining of former police officers, the training of new recruits and the incorporation of ex-combatants? What was the level of co-operation at regional/continental /international levels between state police agencies? Were reforms and new developments aid dependent or sustainable long-term? As regards alternative policing structures, what was legally allowed? Was new legislation and regulation required and could this be enforced? What was the relative effectiveness of different accountability mechanisms? What regulations did the government have for managing the relationship between public and private police? Are the two governments comparable?

To establish answers to these questions a range of senior police officers and officials in the Ministries responsible for them were interviewed. The published output confirms that this objective has been met.

5. To establish policy options for national internal security that are based on agreed principles and correspond to practical reality. In particular, to evaluate whether there was any basis for utilising more effectively non-state policing capacities to complement and strengthen
state police structures. To what extent existing legislation, oversight and co-operation could be improved. Was it feasible to construct a national internal security policy that integrates, regulates, mobilises, and empowers all those willing to preserve law and order in an acceptable manner in post-conflict states? If so on what principles? Could the two countries learn from one another or should they follow different paths?

The published output confirms that this objective has been met.

3. Methods

Because individuals and groups are in a unique position to depict and analyse their own experience of policing, the fieldwork emphasised participatory methods. Survey sites across the country were chosen that included poor neighbourhoods in the capital and in a provincial cities; the rural margins of the capitals and provincial towns; and rural districts.

The principal methods used were semi-structured interviews, focus groups, workshops, examination of government records and observation. The interviews and focus groups were conducted in English or in local languages with an interpreter according to the wish of those interviewed. With non-existent or unreliable voting/tax registration, random sampling proved problematic, so purposive sampling was used in interviewing users of policing (ensuring a balance between urban and rural environments, and of gender). For other data gathering, key figures were selected from those authorising and providing policing (state police, commercial security, work-based security associations, youth groups, local authority security provision, other state security organs), and other professionals with insights into internal security and crime (government administration, commercial, legal NGOs, journalists, jurists, academics).

Every adult interviewed was assured of confidentiality; told the purpose of the research and the background of the researchers; and promised a summary of the findings. They were asked for their consent in publishing their answers.

Given the sensitivity about research into internal security, open workshops for all stakeholders (including all relevant government agencies and departments) were organised in both countries to clarify our intentions and to disseminate our findings.

In summary, individual interviews were conducted with:

**Rwanda:**
Concerning security provision, it included eight senior Rwanda National Police (RNP) officers together with lower rank police officers; five local government officers; five commercial security managers; five work-based security associations; two senior officers of the Local Defence Force; the Ombudsman; and one member of the Kigali Traffic Wardens.

Concerning the experience of security provision, it included interviewing Kigali Shopkeepers (central business district); residents and youths of Kimisagara (urban Kigali); residents of Igihogwe residents (urban/rural fringe of Kigali); residents and a women’s group of Jali (rural outside Kigali); residents and a women’s group of Cyabatanze (rural village); residents and a men’s group of Rugende mudugudu (rural village); Street boys (Kigali); Kibuye women (small town); residents of Tumba Gitwa (urban Butare)

Also interviewed were key figures from the legislature, including the senate foreign affairs cooperation and security committee; the judiciary; human rights activists; genocide survivors; victims of crime; diplomats.

**Liberia:**
Concerning security provision, it included 26 senior police officers of the Liberia National Police (LNP); the Minister of National Security; the Director of the Monrovia City Police; the Director and two senior officers of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); three senior officers of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA); two senior officers of the Bureau of Naturalization and Immigration (BIN); four senior offices of the Liberia Seaport Police; a senior officer of Roberts International Airport security; the Director of the Ministry of Finance Security Monitoring Division; the Head of Operations and five senior officers of UNPOL; eight customary chiefs; nine commercial security managers; three work-based security associations; a community-based Justice NGO; four Community Policing Forum chairman; together with the agents of these institutions.

Concerning the experience of security provision, it included interviewing residents in Monrovia from West Point; Red Light, Paynesville; New Kru Town; and traders and vendors of Randall Street. Residents in Montserrado County from Pkala Town; Blamasee Town and Po River. Residents in Bomi County from the centre of Tubmanburg and from Joseph Town, Tubmanburg. Residents in Margibi County from Kakata; Gbayan Town; Cotton Tree Town; and Dolo Town. Residents in Bong County from Kolietawolah Town; Gbaota Town and Koryah.

Also interviewed were key figures from the legislature, judiciary, human rights activists, the Governance Reform Commission (GRC), school principals, journalists, women’s groups and youth groups.

4. Results

1. The research promoted the transformation of the ‘multi-choice policing’ analytical framework into a strategy for access to justice, rule of law and security sector reform policy. In collaboration with an independent security consultant, Dr Eric Scheye, a ‘multi-layered approach’ was articulated as the best method for governments and donors to support the realities of policing on the ground in post-conflict Africa. In other words, although from the perspective of the end user, policing is an issue of choice and diversity (hence ‘multi-choice’), from the perspective of development strategy, it is an issue of diversity and the support of multiple layers of service providers; layers stretching from state to commercial, community-based and informal policing groups. The research in Rwanda and Liberia highlighted the value in post-conflict countries of this alternative approach to SSR policy. It was evident there was a state-centric bias in current SSR policy and practice, even though this contradicted accepted development principles of a ‘people-centred, locally owned’ approach. The current SSR’s state-centric approach rests upon two fallacies: that the post-conflict and fragile state is capable of delivering justice and security; and that it is the main actor in security and justice. The multi-layered strategy for SSR, however, addresses the issue of who is actually providing justice and security in post-conflict and fragile states. Its great advantage is that it is based, not on the state’s capacity, but on the quality and efficacy of the services received by the end user, regardless of who delivers that service.

2. The importance of linkages between non-state and state policing became very apparent from the Rwanda research. The government’s open admission of its inability to provide on its own a police service to meet all public needs was a welcome honesty rarely seen in Africa. This realistic assessment, combined with the regime ideology of popular justice that incorporates significant local participation, has led them to a hybrid ‘state linked to non-state’ approach to policing. It seeks to combine a professional and disciplined police force with the informal social control mechanisms of popular justice. The latter is a
A hierarchical system of locally provided, voluntary, safety and justice provision. It undertakes the majority of everyday needs from patrols to local courts. Although it is officially not part of the local administration, it has strong links with it and works only with the centre’s approval and support. The importance of the hybrid model is that it has provided an effective, popular and universally accessible policing that is not resource intensive. The success of using informal security structures with close ties to the state does however have to be tempered by the reflection that civil liberties have been compromised by an intrusive surveillance at the local level and by repressive responses to anything perceived as opposition to the ruling party at the national level. On the other hand it should be noted that the local system of policing and justice has been sufficiently effective to close the space for the appearance of autonomous non-state policing (e.g. vigilantes).

3. The importance of linkages was not, however, a lesson that had been learnt by the Liberian government, which was pursuing the model of the state providing all internal security, despite its obvious inability to do so. This leads to a second important observation of the research, which was that **though government capacity can be a severe constraint, faulty government policies exacerbate the problem.** The attempt by Liberia to make policing a state monopoly is a good illustration. With Western states themselves struggling to sustain the Western model of state primacy in policing and criminal justice, it is a strange sight to see one of the poorest countries in the world, whose infrastructure has been devastated by civil war, imitating that Western model. Like Rwanda, Liberia has a police service with few radios, vehicles and skills; and yet the government, in contrast to Rwanda, assumes that a handful of police officers is going to be able to provide crime protection and investigation for the entire country. This is a policy that must ultimately fail. As all post-conflict and fragile states, it is incapable of delivering policing single-handed. Rwanda admits that, and actively looked to volunteers in local communities to shoulder much of the burden of everyday policing. Liberia, on the other hand, develops a Security Sector Reform that makes no mention of the chiefs who do almost all the policing and justice in the countryside; and no mention of commercial security that defends the country’s most important economic assets.

4. It was not just governments that were making serious policy errors. The research also highlighted some of the **serious policy errors being made by international policing experts in their drive to reform the police in Liberia.** UNMIL had an UNPOL section that has provided personnel and equipment, training and advice on strategic and operational planning in Liberia. But there have been mistakes in both the conception and implementation of policing policy driven by UNMIL. First, policing reform, has been too narrow in its focus, ignoring commercial and even more significantly, customary structures - which are the only policing agencies in the countryside. There appears to be no serious consideration as to how the rural areas will be policed, since the planned police strength of 3,500 will inevitably be an urban force that sticks almost exclusively to the tarmac roads. Second, the vetting process of internal security agencies. Of those so far investigated, only 33 per cent have passed the criteria, though this not only (inadequately) sought to remove those who had abused their office or who were political appointees with no qualifications, but also sought to remove any who had served for more than 25 years or who were over 55 years old. At a stroke the most experienced officers were removed when they were most needed and before new officers could gain the experience necessary to replace them. It has proved a costly error. Third, the haste and narrowness of the security reform consultation process both with the police themselves and with the public.
5. Liberia proved to be another case where ‘community policing’ has been introduced without the support of the police themselves to encourage and sustain it. The limited number of examples of its introduction in Liberia already look threatened because of the minimal role given to the public in the programme. The current format has scarcely harnessed the full potential of the contribution that the public could make.

6. Both countries show evidence of the persistence of the politicisation of their policing agencies. The Rwanda Police, for all their positive qualities, still act as regime police, suppressing opposition to the government. As instruments of the government’s intolerance of opposition and even criticism, they have detained opposition politicians, journalists and local election candidates deemed undesirable. In Liberia the administration has a reputation for integrity, nevertheless, the politicisation of the senior management of Liberia’s policing agencies persists. Senior positions have continued to be political appointments of the President. Such policies may provide both regimes with support and loyalty, but do not assure the countries of one of the issues central to the causes of the civil wars, namely, governments and police that are impartiality and free from political manipulation.

7. The importance of political will in determining the quality of state policing also became apparent in the research. The new administration in Liberia has made much of its anti-corruption credentials. Nevertheless within the policing agencies widespread corruption is tolerated. The striking thing about that which makes the Rwandan police so relatively free of corruption is the political will. There is the determination of the president that no such behaviour will tarnish the nation’s image and that discipline will be enforced. Liberia awaits an anti-corruption policy that relies not on institutions, but one that is driven by a political intolerance of police corruption.

5. Outputs

Publications on post-conflict policing drawing on Rwandan and Liberian cases studies:


Publications on post-conflict Policing in Rwanda:


Publications on Post-conflict policing in Liberia
‘He must buy what he stole and then we forgive: restorative justice in Rwanda and Sierra Leone’, *Acta Juridica*, due December 2007.


**Conference papers given:**


‘He must buy what he stole and then we forgive: restorative justice in Rwanda and Sierra Leone’, conference paper, Cape Town, 21-22 September, 2006.

‘Coping with the Failure of State Policing in Liberia’, International workshop paper, Coventry University, 9 July, 2007

**Book:**


**Non-academic reports:**

A summary of the research findings was given to all interviewees who requested it in Rwanda and Liberia and to all key stakeholders, including government departments, the police, NGOs and donors.

**Teaching Video**

A 25 minute presentation, ‘Policing: State and non-state in Africa’ was made with particular reference to Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone for the Institute of Criminology, Cape Town University. It is also available on the researcher’s website: www.africanpolicing.org

**Stakeholder Seminars**

Two seminars were held in-country for all security stakeholders in Rwanda and in Liberia. In a concluding workshop in Monrovia, the research findings were presented before the Minister of Security and more than 100 other security stakeholders from the state and non-state sectors. In the presentation it was argued that the government should broaden its understanding of the security sector to include all policing groups and should base its forthcoming national security policy on a multi-layered approach that ensured a partnership between state, community-based and commercial policing.

An international workshop was held on 9 July 2007 at Coventry University to disseminate the findings of the research and to reflect on their implication for non-state policing and Security Sector Reform in Africa and the wider developing world. Present
were representatives of academia, UK government and commercial security consultants: Alice Hills, Leeds University; Gordon Peake, Security Consultant; Bill Dixon, Keele University; Simon Massey, Coventry University; Piet Biesheuvel DFID/Libra Advisory Group; Lars Buur, Danish Institute of International Studies; Suzette Heald, London School of Economics; Peter Alexander Albrecht Alert's Peacebuilding Issues Programme on SSR; Elrena van der Spuy, University of Cape Town.

Data sets
The transcripts of the interviews, focus groups and workshop have been accepted by ESDS UK Data Archive.

6. Impacts
Representatives of the following organisations received a full country research report.

**Rwanda:**
Rwanda Police Force (RNP); Garsec Security Company; Intersec Security Company; Fodey Security and Alarm Systems; KK Security; Money Lenders Association, Kigali; ATRACO Association pour le Developpement de l'Artisanat au Rwanda; Assetanarwa (the motor bike taxi association); Local Defence Force (LDF); Office of the Ombudsman; Kigali Traffic Wardens; Deputies and Senators; the Senate Foreign Affairs Cooperation and Security Committee; Judges; LDGL (Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la region des Grands Lacs; Human Rights Watch; IBUKA (survivors association); Development Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden.

**Liberia:**
Liberia National Police (LNP); Monrovia City Police; National Bureau of Investigation; Drugs Enforcement Agency; Ministry of National Security; Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation; Liberia Seaport Police (LSP); Roberts International Airport Security; Ministry of Finance Security Monitoring Division; UNPOL; Customary Chiefs; REGSA (Regional Guard Service Agency); J.P.Life Guard Service; Dove Security Guard Services; EXSECON; FAITH Security Systems; Public Safety Division of the Ministry of Justice; Plant Protection Force, Firestone; General, Federation of Road Transport Union; Liberia Marketing Association; Foundation for International Dignity; chairmen of Community Police Forums; Legislative Representatives; Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia; Counsellors; Magistrates; Attorneys; journalists; Prison Assistance Programme; Rural Human Rights Activists Programme; Liberia Watch for Human Rights; Center for Democratic Empowerment; ECOWAS Civil Society Movement in Liberia; Friends of the Poor; Liberia National Law Enforcement Association (LINLEA); West African Network for Peacebuilding; Liberia Women’s Initiative; Federation of Liberian Youth (FLY); Governance Reform Commission (GRC) of Liberia.